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Indonesia hias  niadic  substantial progress devel-  sive environniental management strategy must
opino sound environmental maniagement  poli-  be based on a balanice  belween regulator) and
cies, but has concentrated largely on regulatory  fiscal inistruments.
instruments, making limiited use oflfiscal policv.
Successful implementation of this strategy
Alimed conitends  that fiscal policy can and  will require strong political support and continu-
should plav a major role in improving the quality  ous effonrs to improve the country 's institutional
ofl Indonesia's environment.  But a comprehcn-  franework.
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Economic  Role  of Natural  Resources
1.  Natural  resources  play  a critical  role  in Indonesia's  development.
In addition  to crude  oil  and  natural  gas  derivatives,  the  country  enjoys
substantial  reserves  of coal,  tin,  nickel,  gold and  other  minerals. The
world's  richest  commercial  forest  is found  here,  as  well as  very diverse
fishery  resources. Although  agricultural  diversity  is also  substantial,  rice
and  tree crops  (rubber,  palm  oil,  coconut,  etc.)  dominate  total  production,
benefitting  greatly  from  the  abundant  water  resources  and fertile  soil  in  many
areas  of the  country.
2.  The direct  contribution  of renewable  and  exhaustible  resources  to
economic  development  in Indonesia  can  be approximated  by the share  of primary
producing  sectors--agriculture,  forestry,  fishing  and  mining--in  total  value
added,  exports  and  employment. As shown  in Table  1,  nearly  40 percent  of  GDP
is contributed  by the  direct  exploitation  and  primary  processing  of natural
Table  1:  DIRECT  CONTRIBUTION  OF PRIMARY  PRODUCTION
(X)
1983-89  Share  of
Share  of  Growth merchandise  Share  of
GDP  rate  e'ports  employment
(p.a.)  1989/90  1988
Renewable  Resources  21.8  3.7  22.1  55.6
Agriculture  19.2  3.7  11.3
- Food  crops  13.5  3.2  0.8
- Other  crops  3.4  5.1  9.8
- Livestock  2.3  4.8  0.7
Fishing  1.6  4.9  2.6
Forestry  /a  1.0  1.4  8.2
Exhaustible  Resources  /b  17.9  0.6  61.4  0.8
Oil  and  natural  gas  16.7  0.3  56.6
Other  mining  1.2  4.8  4.8
Total  Primary  Sectors  39.7  2.3  83.5  56.4
/a  Logs,  sawn  timber  and  plywood.
/b  Includes  crude  oil  and  condensates,  natural  gas,  LNG  and  LPG,  but excludes
other  oil  products.
Source: Central  Bureau  of Statistics  and  Bank  Indonesia.- 4.  -
resources. The  inclusion  of further  stages  of downstream  processing  will
raise  this  proportion  substantially.  Despite  the  recent  progress  with
diversification  of exports,  the foreign  exchange  contribution  of the  primary
sectors  has remained  dominant--representing  84 percent  of  merchandise  export
earnings  in 1989/90. In terms  of employment  contribution,  an estimated
56 percent  of the  workforce  was engaged  in  the  primary  sectors  as of 1988.
3.  Indonesia  has a long-standing  commitment  to the  basic  concepts  of
sound  environmental  management,  and  a  number  of corrective  steps  have already
been  taken  to reduce  environmental  degradation  and  promote  a  more sustainable
pattern  of development. Nevertheless,  an important  policy  agenda  for  the
appropriate  management  of the  environment  remains  to be developed  or
implemented. Overall,  the focus  of environmental  management  has been on
regulatory  instruments. In many  areas,  appropriate  regulatory  policies  have
been formulated,  although  effective  implementation  in some  instances  remains
to  be accomplished.  In a few  other  areas,  further  regulatory  policies  are
necessary. The  use  of fiscal  policy  has  been limited.
Objectives  and  Scope  of  the  Paper
4.  The  objective  of this  paper  is to examine  the  role  of fiscal  policy
in the  management  of Indonesia's  environment. The  aim is to  develop  a
framework  that  will allow  an examination  of possible  fiscal  instruments
(taxes,  subsidies,  public  expenditure)  and  their  relevance  to Indonesia's
context. It is important  to  note that  fiscal  policy  is one  possible  area  of
policy  intervention.  Regulatory  policies  would  also  continue  to play  a major
role. A comprehensive  environmental  management  strategy  will need to  be based
on a balanced  combination  of regulatory  and  fiscal  policy  instruments.
Furthermore,  a critical  element  underlying  the  successful  implementation  of
this  strategy  will be the  availability  of an appropriate  institutional
mechanism.
5.  The  paper  is  organized  as follows. Following  this  introductory
section,  an overview  of Indonesia's  key  environmental  issues  is  provided  in
Section  II.  In Section  III,  the framework  for  fiscal  policy  instruments  is
reviewed  briefly. In Section  IV,  the  Indonesian  Government's  progress  on
environmental  management  policies  is examined  briefly  to provide  the
background  for  the  discussion  of possible  fiscal  policy  options  in Section  V.
Finally,  Summary  and  Conclusions  are  provided  in Section  VI.-3-
SECTION  II:  OVERVIEW  OF INDONESIA'S  KSY  ENVIRONMENTAL  ISSUES  1/
Economic  Development  and  Environment
6.  Indcnesia's  environmental  pressures  are  closely  linked  to the  key
development  challenges  that  are faced  by the  nation. Despite  very impressive
growth  performance  since  the  1970s  and  substantial  progress  in  reducing
poverty,  Indonesia,  at $500  per  capita  income,  remains  a low income  country,
with some  30  million  people  still  -emaining  below  the  poverty  line. At the
same  time,  an estimated  2.3  million  new  workers  are  entering  the  labor  force
annually  in the  1990s. Consequently,  poverty  alleviation  and  employment
generation  remain  among  Indonesia's  most  pressing  development  challenges.
7.  These  development  challenges  have  major  implications  for
environmental  management. One reason  is the  spatial  pattern  of Indonesia's
development. Of the  population  of 179  million,  about  62  percent  are located
in the  inner  islands  of Java,  Madura,  Bali  and  Lombok,  which together  account
for  only  about  8 percent  of Indonesia's  land. Population  densities  in Java
are  among  the  highest  in the  world.  Yet  Java's  population  continues  to grow
at about  1.8  percent  per annum. There  is  very little  scope  to absorb
additional  labor  in Java's  agriculture.  Manufacturing  must  necessarily
provide  the  momentum  for  growth  of output  and  employment  in Java  and  other
land-scarce  inner  islands. The threat  to  environment  arises  pr.imarily  from
the  growing  population,  industrial  development,  and  the resulting  pressures  on
land  and  water  resources. Java's  cities,  for  example,  are  expected  to double
in size  between  1980  and  2000. Already,  increasing  population  densities  along
Java's  north  coast  are  straining  the  capacity  of coastal  ecosystems  to deal
with municipal  waste  and  industrial  pollution,  and  shortages  of clean  water
threaten  both  human  health  and  industrial  development. Another  critical
environmental  concern  in  Java is  the soil  erosion  resulting  from  inappropriate
watershed  management. In Java,  virtually  all  the  high-quality  arable  land  is
already  under  cultivation. The  only  land  available  for further  agricultural
expansion  is the  often  erodible,  low-yielding  upland  areas  of upper  watershed
catchments. The  erosion  problems  result  from  inappropriate  cropping  patterns
in these  upper  watersheds.
8.  The  development  process  has  also  produced  environmental  pressures  in
the  outer  islands. These  outer  islands  are  the repository  of most of
Indonesia's  forest  and  land  resources. They  account  for  close  to 60  percent
of all forested  area  in Southeast  Asia,  and  more than  98 percent  of all
forests  in Indonesia. These  closed  canopy  forests  are  under  increasing
pressure  as a result  of population  growth  and  economic  development. In the
decade  between  1973  and 1983,  dryland  agriculture  expanded  at 1.8  percent  per
annum  in  Java,  3.7  percent  in  Sumatra,  4.6  percent  in Kalimantan  and
5.6  percent  in Sulawesi. Since  1980,  Government-sponsored  programs  in the
outer  islands  have  put  nearly  2  million  hectares  in production  and  there  has
been a rapid  growth  in the  exploitation  of timber  and  other  forest  products.
These  factors  have led  to a sharp  increase  in the  rate  of deforestation  and  an
uneven  pattern  of land  use.  Deforestation  rate  for  national  forests  is
estimated  to  have been  about  1.3  million/ha  (1.2  percent)  per  annum  over the
1/  The  discussion  of this  section  draws  heavily  from  World  Bank (1990a).1982-90  period. The  deforestation  problem  is further  accentuated  by the
inefficient  and  unsustainable  pattern  of forest  resource  exploitation  induced
by the  current  incentive  system.
Land  Management
9.  There  are  two  aspects  of the  land  management  problem  as related  to
the  environment: (a)  inefficient,  unsustainable  land  use  in the outer
islands;  and (b)  soil  erosion  in Java's  upper  watersheds.
10.  Land  Management  Problems  in the  Outer  Islands. The  demand  for  land
in  the  outer  islands  has  been growing  at an increasing  pace in response  to a
relatively  high  natural  rate  of growth  of  population,  migration  and
government-supported  development  projects. On the  other  hand,  the
availability  of land  has  posed  a serious  problem. The  main difficulties  are:
(a)  prevalence  of traditional  land  laws  have  precluded  the  emergence  of a
well-functioning  land  market;  (b)  government  policies,  which regard  land  as a
national  asset  to be used for  public  benefit,  discourage  the  payment  of
compensation  for  land  intended  for  smallholder  development;  (c)  the
classification  oi land  under  forestry  is  unduly  restrictive  and inefficient,
creating  major  diff5nulties  for  land  procurement  for  other,  more efficient
uses;  and (d)  traditional  shifting  cultivators  also  face  potential
difficulties  as government  policies  (The  Basic  Forestry  Law) recognizes  the
right  of local  people  to harvest  forest  products  other  than  timber,  but it
does  not  allow  local  smallholders  to log  or to cultivate  Forestry  Department
land.  The implications  of these  policies  have  been:  first,  the  lack  of a
well-functioning  land  market  has resulted  in encroachment  on unclaimed  forest
lands;  second,  smallholders  have little  incentive  in perennial  crops  or soil
conservation  measures;  finally,  local  smallholders  have only  limited  incentive
to protect  the forest  or to invest  in stable  production  systems. The  end
result  has  been inefficient  and  unsustainable  deforestation,  and  loss  of soil
productivity.
11.  The  Problem  of Soil  Erosion  in  Java.  In  Indonesia,  36  watershed
areas  totalling  10.4  million  ha are  classif'ed  as critical  lands. Host
watersheds  in Java  are  potentially  subject  to serious  erosion,  but "critical"
areas  are thought  to cover  about  1.9  million  ha and  include  about  12  million
people. Erosion  rates  are  high in Java--about  6-12  tons/ha/year  on volcanic
soils  and  about  20-60  tons/ha/year  on limestone  soils.2/ This  compares  with
about  0.7  tons  of soil/ha/year  in the  United  States  (World  Bank,  1990a).
These  h!gh rates  are  due  mainly  to the  high levels  and  intensity  of tropical
rainfall,  but  they are  exacerbated  by the  loss  of ground  cover  in the  hills.
The  latter  problem  is  caused  by inappropriate  cropping  patterns  and  absence  of
soil  conservation  measures.
12.  Two  types  of costs  are incurred  from  soil  erosion:  on-site  losses  in
agricultural  productivity;  and  off-site  costs  in the  form  of siltation  of
irrigation  channels,  reservoirs  and  ports,  flooding  in low-lying  areas,  damage
2/  It should,  however,  be noted  that  high erosion  rates  under  tropical
conditions  are  usually  partially  offset  by higher  rates  of soil
formation.5-
to coastal  fisheries,  disruptions  to  urban  and industrial  water  supplies  and
increased  damage  due  to fertilizer  and  pesticide  runoffs. Costs  of soil
erosion  on Java  are  estimated  at about  $400  million  per  year (Magrath  and
Arens,  1989).  Of this,  nearly  80 percent  are  due to  on-site  costs  such  as the
siltation  of irrigation  systems  and  the loss  of reservoir  capacity.
13.  A number  of studies  demonstrate  the  potential  for  reducing  soil  loss
with improved  farm  technologies  (Roche,  1986;  Saragih,  1986). Javanese
farmers  are  quick  to adopt  new farming  systems,  provided  incentives  are
appropriate. The  main constraint  to adopting  recommended  upland  farming
practices  is their  cost (Gauchon,  1976;  Bersten  and  Sinega,  1986;  Tampubolon
and  Saragih,  1986). Apart  from  research  programs  to develop  lower  cost
technologies  for  upland  farming,  efforts  are  also  needed  to improve  the
returns  to  upland  farming.
Forestry  Management
14.  In 1950,  the  area  under  forest  in Indonesia  was reported  to be about
144  million  ha.  In 1990,  the  forest  base  was estimated  at 109  million  ha (see
Table  2).  Of the  1990  forest  base,  62.2  million  ha  were considered  to  have
management  potential,  consisting  of 40.8  million  ha of  mixed  hardwood
production  forests,  2.1  million  ha of tidal  forests  and  19.3  million  ha of
conversion  and  unclassed  forests. Of the  total  base of production  forests,
some  30.4  million  ha have  not  yet been  logged.
Table  2:  AREA  AND  FUNCTIONAL  CLASSIFICATION  OF FOREST,  1950-90
(million  hectares)
1950  1990
Conservation  forest  18.8  14.6
Protection  forest  30.3  25.2
PLCoduCL  foreL  ''.  St
Conversion  forest  30.5/a  18.7
Unclassified  n.a.  4.0
Total  144.0  108.6
la  Includes  unclassified.
Source: GOI/FAO  (1990).
15.  As noted,  deforestation  at the  rate  of 1.2  ,  :rcent  per  annum  has
happened  in recent  years,  which  is significantly  more rapid  than  the  long-term
trend  of 0.7  percent  (1950-90).  Even  witn some  improvement  over the  recent
deforestation  rate,  about  one-fourth  of the  natural  forest  cover  remaining  in
1990  could  be lost  bv the  year  2030,  most of it  accounted  for  by loss  of
conversion  forests  and  production  forests  (GOI/FAO,  1990). Accordingly,  the
annual  allowable  cut  from  natural  forest  is  expected  to fall  from  some  34-6-
million  cubic  meters  at  present  to some  21  million  cubic  meters  by the  year
2030.
16.  Although  some  deforestation  is inevitable  and  is consistent  with the
efficient  utilization  of forest  resources,  deforestation  on a scale  as rapid
as in the  recent  years  could  jeopardiJ.e  the  longer-term  availability  of forest
resources. Moreover,  the  present  rate  of deforestation  leads  to land
degradation,  which reduces  the  productivity  of farmers  and  disrupts  water
supplies. Deforestation  also  kas  a  number  of negative  consequences  of
national  and international  concern. Large-scale  clearing  for  agriculture
provides  smoke  and  carbon  dioxide  which  contribute  to global  warming;  and
forest  clearing  threatens  biological  diversity  and  endangered  spacies.
17.  There are  also serious inefficiencies in logging practices.
Management  of forest  concessions  is largely  in the  hands  of private
concessionaires.  Recent  surveys  show  that  up to 40  percent  of standing  stock
is  damaged  in logging  operations  and,  where  areas  are  relogged  before  the
35 year logging  cycle  elapses,  the  damage  is  higher  (GOI/FAO,  1990). As
valuable  species  regenerate  slowly  and  only  under  specific  conditions,
selective  logging  also  tends  to preserve  more robust  out  less  valuable
species. Since  logged-over  areas  have  greatly  reduced  value,  many
concessionaires  do little  to protect  their  holdings  from  encroachment  and  fire
once  they  are logged.
18.  The  GOI/FAO  study  presents  evidence  which  suggests  that
deforestation  has  a strong  positive  correlation  with population  density,  and
negative  correlation  with agricultural  productivity  and growth  of real income.
So,  policies  for improving  the income  prcspects  of the  rural  poor  in the  Outer
Islands  will play  an important  role  in reducing  deforestation.  However,  in
addition  to  deforestation  resulting  from  encroachment  upon forest  land,  other
factors  contributing  to the  inefficient  and  unsustainable  exploitation  of
forestry  resources  include: weak incentives  for  concessionaires  to  manage
their  holding  sustainably;  low  capture  of rent  by the  Government  through
taxes,  thereby  causing  excessive  forest  resource  exploitation;  inadequate
capacity to implement regulations (World Bank. 1QQan.  v-  e.  '^^
Gillis,  1988).
Water  Resource  Management
19.  Water  management  issues  are  most intense  on Java,  with problems
concerning both water quantity and aualitv. The  ±4scusio
4 . hsr  .crncentrates
on the  quantity  issue;  the  quality  issue  is considered  later  in the  general
context  of the  pollution  problem. Although  Java is  well endowed  with
rainfall,  most of the  rivers  are less  than  50  km long,  and  very shallow
catchments  combined  with deforestation  have increased  the  variability  in run-
off  and  caused  water shortages  downstream,  particularly  in dry  years. Under
the circumstances,  the  allocation  of surface  water  and groundwater  for
agriculture,  municipal  and  industrial  use  is an issue  of growing  importance.
20.  Java  has total  surface  water  flows  of about  170  billion  cubic  meters
(Bm3)  annually,  but firm  water  flows  are  onl,  about  78  Bms  or 42 percent
(tIBRl.  1990a). Irrigated  agriculture  is the  heaviest  user of burface  water,
requiring  about  60  BmB  annually. There  are serinolc  re-ncetno regarding  the-7-
efficiency  of  water  use  for irrigation.  Municipal  water supply  is low,  at
about  2.25  Bm 8. Despite  this  relatively  low  supply,  however,  urban  and
industrial  pollution  are  reducing  the  quality  of raw  water  supply  and
competition  for  water  in the  dry  season  is already  intense. Urban  and
industrial  water  use  are  expected  to grow  at  high rates,  reflecting  rapid
urban  and  industrial  growth  and  current  low  levels  of piped  municipal  water
supply. Unaccounted  for  water  accounts  for  about  45 percent  of municipal
water  and  efficiency  improvements  and  better  cost  recovery  are required  if
future  supply  targets  are  to be  met.
21.  Groundwater  extraction  is about  8.7  Bm8. Because  groundwater  is
relatively  safe  and convenient,  it supplies  about  60  percent  of  water  for
rural  domestic  use  and is the  major  source  of  water in  cities  that  have
polluted  surface  waters.  In  Jakarta,  private  groundwater  abstraction  provides
about  four  times  as  much  water  as from  municipal  supply,  and it  provides
65  percent  of the  water for  industry.
22.  The  growing  demand  for  water  suggests  an emerging  problem. Future
water  reguirements  in the  year 2010  are  projected  at  about  88 Bm 3-- a shortage
of 10 Bm . A large  part  of this shortage  could  be eliminated  by ensuring  the
efficiency  of  water  use, especially  in irrigation. The  cost  to the  Government
for  supplying  irrigation  water  on farms  in  Java is  estimated  at about
$110  per  ha/year  (IBRD,  1990a). As against  this,  irrigation  water is  provided
virtually  free  of cost.3/ Appropriate  charges  for  groundwater  are  even  more
important  than those  for  surface  water,  as groundwater  is only  a partially
renewable  resource. At the  present  time,  different  institutions  are
responsible  for irrigation,  municipal  water  supply  and  groundwater  use.  This
hampers  planning  and leads  to resource  conflicts. At the  river  basin  and
regional  level,  water  resource  planning,  management  and  operations  could  also
be improved  to better  take  into  account  multisectoral  needs  and  environmental
concerns.
Pollution  Management
23.  In Java,  water  pollution  poses  an immediate  threat  to  human  welfare
and industrial  growth. This  problem  is intensified  by  water shortages  in the
dry season,  which  prevents  wastes  from  being  flushed  away from  urban  centers.
The  most excessive  pollutant  in Indonesian  rivers  is from  human  waste.  Due  to
high levels  of human  and  industrial  waste,  eight  major  rivers  on Java's  north
coast  are regarded  as significantly  or seriously  polluted.
24.  Apart  from  health  hazards,  severe  water  pollution  has caused
industries  in areas  such  as Surabaya  to close  in dry  years  because  of usable
raw  water shortage. Costs  are  also  incurred  from loss  in fishing  and
aquaculture,  and damage  suffered  by  mangrove  and  fragile  coastal  areas.
25.  Although  industrial  pollution  is less  pervasive  than  pollution  from
human  waste,  it is  already  a major  factor  in the  overall  pollution  level  on
Java's  north  coast.  Industrial  pollution,  particularly  in the  form  of toxic
substances,  can also  have far  more serious  consequences  than  human  wastes,  as
3/  An irrigation  service  fee  has recently  been  initiated  on a  pilot  basis.-8-
these  substances  become  concentrated  in the  food  chain  and  cannot  be removed
from  water  by conventional  water  treatment  processes. Monitoring  in the
Tangerang  Industrial  Zone,  for  example,  found  serious  pollution  at all  ten
monitoring  stations,  and  excess  levels  of chromium,  cadmium,  mercury  and
selenium  in  different  locations  (World  Bank,  1990a).
26.  The  environmental  consequences  if energy  production,  consumption  a..id
distribution  depend  critically  on the  mix  of energy  resources  employed. The
large  share  of oil in total  energy  has led  to the  pollution  of delicate
estuarine  areas (in  Riau  and South  Sumatra)  and  mangrove  swamps  (Cilacap  in
Central  Java)  through  spillage,  blowouts,  disposal  of brines,  venting  of
hydrogen  sulphide,  and the  disposal  of  mercury  removed  from  natural  gas.  In
addition,  the  transportation  of oil in  tankers  is  a major  source  of pollution
of the  marine  environment,  especially  as a result  of the  heavy  traffic  in  the
Straits  of  Malacca  and  the  associated  need  for  deballasting,  as well as
uncontrolled  cleaning  of tarkers,  spillage  during  loading  and  unloading,  and
shipping  accidents. Further,  the  use  of gasoline  ano  diesel  in transportation
cauE;es  significant  .ir  pollution.  particularly  in Jakarta,  Surabaya  and
Bandung,  through  emissions  of sulphur  and  nitrogen  oxides,  carbon  monoxide,
hydrocarbons  and other  organic  compounds,  other  metals  and  sulphates,  and
emission  of odor and  noise.
27.  While  domestic  coal  consumption  is still  at  very low  levels,  it is
projected  that  consumption  could  rise  thirty-fold  by the  year 2000.
Experience  with mining  projects  in Indonesia  suggest  that  the  environmental
impact  of exploiting  coal reserves  are  potentially  large--loss  of  usable  land,
erosion  resulting  in turbidity  and sedimentation,  and solid  waste generation.
Another  major source  of environmental  management  problem  in the  energy  sector
arises  from  hydropower  projects,  and revolves  principally  around  the  need tc-
compensate  and  resettle  the  population  affected  by the  reservoir  construction.
28.  Among  the  factors  that  have  contributed  to the  pollution  problem
include: inadequate  institutional  arrangements  for  implementing  industrial
pollution  regulations;  lack  of an incentive  framework  for  limiting  pollution;
inadequate  sanitation  facilities;  lack  of environmental  standards  and  policies
for  major  energy  projects;  and  lack  of appropriate  project  siting  and
industrial  location  policies.SECTION  III:  THE  FRAMlEWORK  FOR  FISCAL  POLICY
Introduction
29.  Mu_h  1'.as been  w.ittcn  in  the  litcraturc  about  how  fiscal  policy
instruments  could  contribute  to the  control  of environmental  damage. The
l.terature  is especially  rich  on the  subject  of the  role  of fiscal  policy  in
the  nianagement  of pollution  (comprehensive  text  books  include: Baumol  and
Oates,  1988;  Tietenberg,  1988;  Pearci  and  Turner,  1990). The  focus  on the
pollution  aspects  can  partially  be explained  by the  amenability  of this
particular  environmental  problem  to the  conventional  tools  of economic
analysis. The  pollution  problem  is  a standard  example  of the  problem  of
externality--B  situation  whereby  the  welfare  of an individual  depends  upon
both its  own.  actions  as  well as on the  decisions  of others,  even though  the
other  individuals  do not  pay  any  particular  attention  to the  effects  of their
decision  on the  first  individual. In the  case  of pollition,  the externality
is  negative,  in the  sense  of having  an adverse  impact  on the individual's
welfare.
The  Rationale  for  Public  Interven on
30.  A standard  example  of environmental  negative  externality  is the
pollution  of air  by t:me  emission  of smoke  from  a factory. Tn a free  market
environment,  the  factory  will  produce  too  much smoke  because  it does  not  take
into  account  the  air  pollution  cost  that  it imposes  on others. In Box  1, the
DD line represents  the  demand  curve  for  the  factory's  output  (steel). The  MPP
curve  represents  the supply  curve (the  private  marginal  cost)  for  the
factory's  production. The factory  produces  two  outputs,  steel  and  pollution--
the  higher  the  price  ot steel,  the  higher  is the  production  of  both outputs.
Although  the  factory  does  not  consider  the  cost  of pollution,  society  does.
The social  cost  of producing  steel  is represented  by the  MCS line.  The
following  problems  emerge  in  a free  market  situation:
o  there  is excessive  production  of the  pollution-intensive  good
%-..CC!1J.
o  there  is too  mucli  pollution;
o  the  price  of the  pollution-intensive  good  is too  low.
wcutLive  action,  therefore,  is  needed  to induce  the  factory  to produce  the
socially  optimal  level  of pollution.
31.  Coase  Theorem. The  mere existence  of an externality  need  not
necessitate  public  intervention--the  market  will still  function  efficiently,
provided  property  rights  are  well defined. This is the  central  message  of a
classic  proposition  known  as the 'Coase  Theorem'  (Coase,  1960).  The  Coasian
proposition  runs  as follows. The -. eason  that  the  market  solution  results  in
too  much pollution  is  because  the  property  rights  for  clean  air  are  not  well
defined. If the  factory  were to  hold these  rights,  the  victims  could  always
pay the factory  to reduce  pollution. If the  victims  were to  hold the rights,
the  factory  will buy the  right  to pollute. In either  case,  the  bargaining
pLUue6b  will conitinue  until  the  optimal  level  of  pollution  is reached.- 10  -
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32.  Despite  the  elegance  of this  proposition,  the practical  relevance  of
the  Coasian  theorem  is rather  limited. Two  critical  assumptions  are:
(a)  that the  bargaining  process  is costless;  and (b)  there  are  a small  number
of parties  so  that  bargaining  is feasible. In the  real  world,  both
assumptions  are likely  to be violated  in  most situations  underlying  the
management  of environment. Nevertheless,  the  Coase  theorem  suggests  the  very
important  role  of property  rights  that  will need to  be taken  into  account  in
designing  proper  policy  interventions.
The  Role of Fiscal  Policy
33.  The  Pigouvian  Tax.  If  market  solution  is inefficient,  how  can the
socially  optimal  solution  be attained? The  answer  was provided  long  ago  by
the  well-known  British  economist  Arthur  Pigou  (1932). According  to Pigou,
given  competitive  environment,  the  optimal  policy  intervention  is to impose  a
tax (or  effluent  fee)  on the  factory  that  is equal  to the  marginal  social
damage. In terms  of Box 1, the  Government  needs  to impoce  a fee (tax)  per
unit of emission  equal  to lab',  or the  gap  between  the  private  and  the  social
cost curves.4/ This  tax,  known  as the  Pigouvian  tax,  will ensure  that  the
factory  produces  the  optimal  level  of pollution. In  other  words,  the
Pigouvian  tax  will induce  the  factory  to fully  internalize  the externality.
4/  By construction,  the  gap  between  MPP and  MCS represents  the  marginal
social  damage.- 11  -
34.  A Pigouvian  subsidy? An alternative  fiscal  policy  instrument  is  the
use of subsidies  to induce  the  factory  to produce  the socially  optimal  level
of pollution. While  in the short-term  tax  and  subsidy  will yield  the  same
level  of  pollution,  in the long-term  the  results  could  be different. Thus,
Baumol  and  Oates (1988)  have shown  that in  the  long-run  competitive
equilibrium  subsidies  will induce  new firms  to enter  (as  profits  are  higher
with subsidies  relative  to taxes);  hence  a larger  industry  output  and  a lower
price  for  the  pollution-intensive  good  will result. Thus,  even at the
theoretical  level,  taxes  are  preferable  to s,ibsidies  as an instrument  for
pollution  control. At the  practical  level,  taxes  also  provide  revenues  to the
government,  while subsidies  impose  a budgetary  burden. This  becomes  an
important  element,  especially  in  developing  countries,  for  the  design  of  an
effective  environmental  management  program.
35.  Practical  Difficulties  in Implementing  the  Pigouvian  Tax. At the
theoretical  level,  the  optimality  of the  Pigouvian  tax breaks  down  if the
underlying  assumptions  fail  to  hold.  Among  the  critical  assumptions  are:  the
prevalence  of competitive  markets  and  well-behaved  production  functions
(technically  known  as concave  production  functions).  The  market  structure
underlying  the  polluting  industry  is  particularly  important  for  the design  of
environmental  policy. Under  a  monopoly  or oligopoly  situation,  the  polluting
industry  may routinely  shift  the  cost  of the  pollution  tax  to the  consumers,
without  attempting  to reduce  the  level  of  pollution  to rvduce  its  tax
obligation. As a result,  the  efficacy  of the  tax  program  will  be severely
constrained. The  practical  difficulties  are  compounded  by the  problem  or
measuring  the  marginal  social  damage  function. In the  absence  of a direct
estimate  of damage,  an indirect  procedure  has  been  proposed  by Baumol  and
Oates  (1971). This  approach,  known  as the  pricing  and  standards  approach,
begins  with a predetermined  set  of standards  and  then  imposes  unit  taxes  to
achieve  these  standards. Although  this  procedure  may  not always  result  in
optimal  allocation  of resources,  it represents  the  least  cost  method  of
achieving  the specified  standards.
36.  As noted,  the  two  main limitations  of taxes  are:  (a)  uncertainty
concerning  the industry's  response;  and (b)  uncertainty  regarding  the  time  it
will take  to achieve  the  desired  level  of response. How about  setting
standards  instead? The  main attraction  of direct  controls  is  that,  given
effective  enforcement,  the  desired  reduction  in the  level  of pollution  can  be
obtained  with little  uncertainty. The  key  presumption  is the  ability  to
ensure  effective  enforcement. The  cost  cf administration  and  the  vigor  and
vigilance  of the responsible  public  agency  cannot,  however,  be taken  for
granted. Indeed,  there  is  evidence  that  for  the same  level  of  pollution
reduction,  market-based  instruments  (taxes,  subsidies,  tradable  permits)  are
less  costly  than  controls  (Tietenberg,  1988). Another  problem  v'-h controls
is  the  potential  for  resource  misallocation,  especially  if the  c.utas  are
allocated  to the firms  arbitrarily  (Baumol  and  Oates,  1988).5/
37.  Combining  Taxes  with Controls. In designing  pollution  policies,  a
combination  of taxes  and  controls  are likely  to  work best.  This is  especially
relevant  to a situation  where the  initial  environmental  degradation  is severe,
5/  A trading  of pollution  quotas  will  be more  efficient.- 12 -
requiring  urgent  attention. As Baumol  and  Oates (1975)  note:  "Hybrid
programs  of taxes  and  controls  thus  represent  a very  attractive  policy
package. The  tax  component  of the  program  functions  to  maintain  the  desired
levels  of environmental  quality  under 'normal'  conditions  at a relatively  low
cost and also avoids the .ipobii  ;u  of  uneconomically demanding controls.  The
controls  constitute  standby  measures  to deal  with adverse  environmental
conditions  that  arise  infrequently,  but  suddenly,  and  which  would result  in
serious  environmental  damage  with  normal  levels  of  waste  emissions. Such  a
mixed  program  should  not involve  notably  higher  administrative  costs  than  a
pure tax  policy,  since  much of the  monitoring  structure  used  for  the latter
should  also be available  for  enforcement  of controls.n
38.  Public  Investment.  Direct  government  investment  could  play  a  major
role  in both  current  and  prospective  environmental  programs. The  variety  of
purposes  served  by these  expenditures  is  enormous. The types  of activity
financed  by the  government  could  be grouped  under  the following  categories:
(a)  damage  prevention  facilities  (e.g.,  municipal  treatment  plants;
(b)  regenerative  activ±ties  (e.g.,  reforestation,  slum  clearance);  and
(a)  research  (e.g.,  pollution  level  measurement  and  control  techniques,
agricultural  production  techniques  to  minimize  environmental  degradation).  As
noted  by Baumol  and  Oates (1988).  the  rationale  for  public  investment  are:
first,  many environmental  services  (clean  air)  are "pure  public  goods",  so
that  a market-based  provision  is unfeasible;  and  second,  an efficient  scale  of
operation  of  pollution  control  facilities  may require  investment  levels  that
much exceed  any single  polluter's  needs.6/
Fiscal  Policy  for  Resource  Management--Land,  Forest  and  Water
39.  The literat-tre  on the  analysis  of resource  management  distinguishes
between  a renewable  and a  non-renewable  (exhaustible)  resource. A depletable
resource  is one for  which the  rate  of replenishment  is so low  that  there  is
little  potential  for  maintaining  or augmenting  the  stock  within  a reasonable
timeframe. A renewable  resource,  on the  other  hand,  is characterized  by a
non-negligible  rate  of replenishment.  Good  examples  are  water,  forest
resources  and  fisheries. The  policy  implications  of  managing  a renewable
resource  differ  significantly  from  a  non-renewable  resource. The  main policy
issue  for  a depletable  resource  involves  the  inter-generational  allocation  of
the shrinking  resource  base  while  developing  a renewable  substitute. For  a
renewable  resource,  the  policy  challenge  is to ensure  the  maintenance  of an
efficient  sustainable  flow.  In the  context  of this  particular  paper,  the
f^-uc  '^  ^^.  th_ custair.able  use of three  6pecific  renewabie  resources--torest,
water  and land  resources.
40.  Forest  Management. A critical  environmental  concern  regarding  a
renewable  resource  such  as forest  is  the risk  of extinction--a  situation  that
could  emerge  if the rate  of extraction  exceeds  the  rate  of regeneration.
Related  concerns  are  the  optimum  rate  of use  over  time  and  generation. An
important  question  here is  whether  the  market  solution  is  necessarily
inefficient,  that  is  whether  there  is an externality  problem. The  market
6/  This is the  traditional  lumpiness  or indivisibility  argument;  efficient
private  provision  could  entail  monopolistic  practices.- 13 -
structure  and  property  rights  have important  bearing  on this  question. For
example,  in  the  case  of a  monopolist  owner,  the  market  will yield  the  socially
optimal  rate  of forest  exploitation  (Tietenberg,  1988).
41.  The  assignment  and  enforcement  of property  rights  depend  upon  both
informal  traditional  practices  and formal  actions  taken  by the  state.
Government  policies  regarding  property  rights  will almost  always  be
controversial,  because  the  assignment  of rights  excludes  non-owners  from
access  to  valuable  resources. This  is a key reason  for  state  ownership  of
many natural  resources. Although  the state  owns  the  bulk of the  forestry
resources,  exploitation  rights  are,  however,  conveyed  to  multiple  individuals,
often  without  adequate  control  of logging  activity. In effect,  therefore,
forestry  becomes  either  an open  access  or a common  property  resource. The
open-access  situation  (a  large  number  of concessionaires  with  no effective
quantity  restraint  on output)  generates  two  types  of externalities: a
contemporaneous  externality  and  an inter-generational  externality. The
contemporaneous  externality,  which  is borne  by the  current  generation,
involves  the  over-commitment  of resources  to forest  exploitation.  New
entrants  in forest  exploitation  will continue  until  profits  are  driven  to
zero. As a result,  each  concessionaire  earns  a lower  rate  of return  (See  Box
2).  The intergenerational  externality  emerges  from  the  reduction  in the  stock
of forest  resources  due  to current  over-exploitation.  In the  case  of a
common-propprty  it111ntinn  (izp.,  thb  onvprnipnt  gives  exploitation  rights  to a
limited  number  of concessionaires),  the  solution  will still  be inefficient  and
may result  in  unsustainable  exploitation.  These  concerns  can  be illustrated
with the  help of the  graph  in Box  2.
42.  Assuming  constant  prices,  the  shape  of the  total  revenue  curve  is
dictated  by the forestry  regeneration  pattern--at  low  levels  of stock,  trees
regenerate  at a fast  pace  and  eventually  the stock  converges  to some  maximum
level  (the  ecosystem's  carrying  capacity). The  cost of forest  exploitation  is
a  monotonic  function  of the  level  of effort. 'tOb"  level  of effort  corresponds
to the  maximum  sustainable  yield  for  forest  outout.  "Oa"  is the  level  of
effort  where returns  are  maximized--the  efficient  level  of forest
exploitation.  A monopoly  ownership  would result  in "Oa"  level
of effort,  which  is efficient  and  clearly  sustainable.  With open  access,  "Oc"
level  of effort  will result  (profits  are  driven  to zero). In a common-
property  situation,  where  access  is controlled,  the solution  will be somewhere
in between,  but still  inefficient.
at  How  can fiscal  policy  help?  Various  interventions  are  possible,
including  use  of fiscal  policy. For example,  the  Government  might  determine
the  optimal  level  of extraction  and  license  concessionaires  accordingly.
Strict  monitoring  will be necessary  to  ensure  this  policy's  effectiveness.
The fiscal  policy  instrument  relevant  to this  problem  is somewhat  analogous  to
the  Pigouvian  solution  to the  pollution  problem--to  impose  a tax  such  that  the
efficient  level  of forest  exploitation  results. In terms  of the  graph  in
Box  2, the  tax  shifts  the  total  cost  curve  from  OT°  to OT 2.- 14  -
Box  2:  FOREST RESOURCE EXPLOITATION
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44.  Land  Management. Under  natural  conditions,  lost  topsoil  is largely
replenished  from  the Lubsoils. However,  there  is  a threshold  level  below
which  land-use  practice3  could  render  it  non-renewable.7/  The environmental
management  problem  is to prevent  topsoil  from  becoming  a depletable  resource
through  appropriate  soil  conservation  measures. A first  question  is the
nature  of the  market  failure--what  is the  source  of externality  and
inefficiency?  As in the  case  of forest  resource  management,  the  externality
and  efficiency  issues  are  linked  to property  rights  and  the  market  structure.
if land  ownership  rights  are  well defined  and  if competitive  markets  prevail,
land  will be used efficiently  and  in  a  sustainable  manner. If,  however,  land
rights  are  not  well defined  so that  land  becomes  a free  access  resource,  there
will be inefficient  and  unsustainable  use.  Due to the  free  access  problem,
there  is  no incentive  to  maintain  land  productivity. Conservation  practices
will not prevail,  and  excessive  topsoil  degradation  will result  in the  loss  of
land  productivity  for  future  generaticns--this  is the  nature  of the
externality  probiem. A related  external  cost results  from  the  deposit  of
sedimentation  downstream.
45.  An obviously  attractive  solution  to the  land  degradation  problem  is
to establish  land  rights  and  promote  the  development  of an efficient  land
market. Even if complete  privatization  is not  feasible  and  common  property
land  prevails,  (as  would  invariably  be the  case  in developing  countries  where
7/  See  Anderson  and Thampapillai  (1990)  for  a good  summary  discussion  of
soil  conservation  issues  in developing  countries.- 15  -
a substantial amount of  rand  will remain under state owrrnrship),  land
degradation can be reduced by defining some form of property right, e.c.,
leasing land to a community or group of individuals  with well-defined rules of
collective ownership (see Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, 1975; Quiggin, 1988).
46.  1.hile  better-defined land ownership or use rights  will certainly
help improve soil conservation, this alone may not be adequate in practice.
When the source of degradetion is the lack of resources to invest in soil
conservation, or that the cost of soil conservation is much higher than the
benefits, private farmers may not invest adequately to maintain sustainable
land use.  The poverty of the fatmers is a major source of land degradation in
developing countries such as Indonesia.  One way fiscal policy could help is
through government expenditure on research to determine low-cost soil
conservation techniques and more effective farming techniques.  More
fundamentally, a general reexamination of the development strategy focussed on
improving the economic condition of the land users might be necessary to
ensure sustainable land use over the longer-term.
47.  Water Resources.  The externality problem in surface water
management emerges from the failure to charge appropriate price for its use.
Many governments consider water as a wmerit" good and therefore provide water
free of charge or at a heavily subsidized price.  This leads to inefficient
and unsustainable consumption.  In the case of groundwater extraction, the
externality problem arises from the free access characteristic of ground
water.  No individual takes into account the fact that its extraction reduces
the supply for others--both contemporaneously and intergenerationally.
48.  Fiscal policy obviously has an important role to play.  For both
surface and ground water management, appropriate pricing/tax policy is needed
to ensure efficient and sustainable consumption.  In the case of ground water
extraction especially, which is a partially renewable resource, a combination
of regulations and water charges/taxes will be important to ensure efficient
use.- 16 -
SECTION  IV:  GOVERNMENT  OF INDONESIA'S  ENVIRONMENTAL  POLICY  PROGRESS
Introduction
49.  As noted,  environmental  degradation  in Indonesia  is associated  with
overall  economic  development. Indonesia's  economic  activities  are strongly
dependent  on natural  resources. The  bulk of Indonesia's  poor  depend  on
natural  resource  intensive  activities  for  their  sustenance.  Economic
development,  poverty  and  environment  are,  therefore,  interlinked. Over  the
past two  decades,  Indonesia  has  made remarkable  progress  in reducing  the
incidence  of poverty  (World  Bank,  1990b). In the  more recent  years,
significant  progress  has been  made towards  reducing  the  dependence  on  natural
resources. Both factors  have contributed  to  making  the  environmental
challenges  more manageable. Continued  progress  in reducing  the incidence  of
poverty  and  reducing  reliance  on  natural  resources  will  play a critical  role
in ensuring  the  protection  of the  environment  over  the longer  term.
50.  To ensure  the  consistency  of the  poverty  alleviation  objective  with
natural  resource  conservation,  careful  attention  to environmental  management
policies  will be of critical  importance. This  has been  well recognized  by the
Government  of Indonesia  and, increasingly,  efforts  are  being  made to  develop
appropriate  policies  and institutional  framework  for  their  implementation.
The remainder  of  this section  provides  a brief  review  of the  various  policy
initiatives  undertaken  by the  Government  to  protect  the  environment. The
discussion  is organized  around  two  main groups  of policy  interventions:
(a)  regulatory  policies;  and (b)  fiscal  policies. The section  is closed  with
a discussion  of progress  made  wich the  institutional  framework  for  the
implementation  of environmental  policies.
Regulatory  Policies
51.  Regulatory  policies  could  be grouped  under  the following  categories:
(a)  emissions  standards;  (b)  marketable  emissions  permits;  (c)  resource
extraction  licenses;  and (d)  property  rights. Emission  standards  specifv
emission  limits  on individual  sources  that  emit  pollutants. Marketable
permits,  on the  other  hand,  allow  a firm  to trade  this  right  to emit.
Resource  exploitation  licenses  restrict  the  level  of extraction  by limiting
the total  number  of operators  and  or a total  volume  of extraction  per  unit  of
time.  Finally,  property  rights  aim  at eliminating  externality  and
environmental  degradation  resulting  from  free  access  to resources.
52.  In Indonesia,  progress  has  been  most significant  in the  area of
regulatory  policies. This  progress,  however,  has  concentrated  on industrial
pollution  control,  forest  management,  and the  regulation  of pesticide  use in
agriculture. Regulatory  policies  for  controlling  pollution  resulting  from
energy,  transport  and  human  waste  disposal  have received  little  attention.
The  types  of regulatory  policies  used  largely  belong  to groups  (a)  and (c)
above.
53.  Industrial  Pollution  Control. A number  of Laws and  Presidential  and
Ministerial  decrees,  dating  back  as early  as 1974,  have sought  to improve  and
protect  the  quality  of  water  by imposing  regulatory  restrictions  on the
emissions  of industrial  waste. More recent  regulations  also require  that  each- 17 -
industrial  activity,  existing  and  proposed,  complete  a preliminary  report  (for
proposed  activities)  or evaluation  report  (for  existing  activities). If the
industrial  activitv  is  deemed  to  have significant  impact,  then a full
environmental  impact  assessment  is required. Although  the legal  structure  for
an industrial  environmental  control  program  is largely  in place,
implementation  has been  constrained  by institutional  difficulties.  A major
challenge  is to strengthen  the  institutional  arrangements  for  pollution
monitoring  and  control  at the  central  level,  and  to replicate  this  and  provide
enforcement  powers  at the  provincial  level.
54.  A number  of important  initiatives  have  been taken  recently  to this
end:
o  a  presidential  decree  has  been issued  to establish  a pollution
monitoring  and  control  agency  reporting  directly  to the  President;
o  a clean  rivers  program .Prokasih)  has  been initiated;  this  program,
involving  eight  provincial  governments,  is  aimed  at reducing  water
pollution  in 24 selected  major  rivers  and  will initially  focus  on
industrial  pollution;
o  a new regulation  has been  enacted  for  the  control  of water
pollution,  which  gives  provincial  governors  increased  authority  to
control  industrial  water  pollution  and  sets  up a licensing  system
for industrial  effluents;  and
o  programs  have  begun  to set  up pollution  monitoring  and  control
agencies  at provincial  level  in  DKI  Jakarta,  West Java,  North
Sumatra  and  West Kalimantan.
55.  Forest  Management. The  main type  of regulatory  policy  used in
forest  management  is the licensing  of exploitation  rights. Forest  concession
rights  (HPH)  are  awarded  to the  private  sector  concessionaires.  At the  end  of
1989.  there  were 561 forest  concessions  covering  a total  of 60.6  million
hectares  (GOI/FAO,  1990). By the  end  of  April  1990,  the  number  of concessions
had increased  to 575.  The  natural  forest  management  under  private  forest
concessions  is regulated  on the  basis  of the  Basic  Forestry  Law (1967).
Evaluations  have indicated  that  the  regulations  prescribed  to ensure  sound
management  are largely  ignored,  leading  to  unsatisfactory  implementation  of
management  principles. Lack of adequate  manpower  and  the large  area  under
concessions  have limited  the  exercise  of control. Among  other  reasons  for  the
situation  were the  use  of contract  loggers  by the  concession;  lack  of  proper
and  detailed  planning  of forest  management  operations;  lack  of sufficient
deterrent  sanctions;  lack  of adequate  information  on silvicultural  systems;
and  other  organizational  shortcomings.
56.  Pesticide  Use Regulations. One  area  where the  Government  has  made
good  progress  concerns  the  use  of pesticides  in  agricultural  production.
Given  their  toxic  ingredients,  inappropriate  or excessive  use of pesticides
can  be hazardous  to  human  health  and  the  environment. Furthermore,  excessive
use  facilitates  the  emergence  of resistant  pests,  thereby  reducing  pesticide
effectiveness  in increasing  farm  productivity.  For  example,  50 to 60 thousand
hectares  of irrigated  rice  were destroyed  in Indonesia  in 1986-87  because  of- 18 -
an outbreak of a pesticide-resistant strain of the brown Planthopper.  As a
result, about 1 million tor of rice  was destroyed.  Furthermore, 35 percent of
the total harvested land had to be converted to a more pest-resistant but less
productive rice variety.  The result was a 10-15 percent fall in rice yields.
The Government reacted promptly by developing an integrated pest management
(IPM) program, with assistance from the FAO and the World Bank.  The use of 57
pesticide formulations have been banned.  Steps have also been taken to
strengthen crop protection field staff and develop IPM crop technology
packages for rice and other crops.
57.  Groundwater Licenses.  Some licensing requirements also exist for
groundwater extraction.  The Directorate of Environmental Ecology in the
Ministry of Mines and Energy is responsible for evaluating groundwater
resources nationwide, for groundwater mapping, and for issuing licenses for
groundwater extraction.  However, in view of implementation constraints, many
private users circumvent licensing requirements and aquifers are being
overdrawn (IBRD, 1990a).
Fiscal Policies
58.  Taxes and Charges.  Although there are a number of taxes and charges
linked to the use of forest and water resources, a systematic approach towards
the use of fiscal policy instruments for environmental management remains to
be developed.  The number of taxes and charges in the forestry sector are too
many and determined on an ad-hoc basis.  There is no direct link between these
taxes/charges and the objectives of efficient and sustainable use of forest
resources.  The two main forestry taxes are:  royalty and reforestation fee.
Timber royalty is levied at the rate of 6 percent of the check price fixed by
the Ministry of Finance and is collected for an estimated volume, based on
output of processed product assuming 50 percent conversion factor.  The
reforestation fee is levied on timber cut on concessions, based on scaled
volumes.  Until June 1989, the reforestation fee  was set at $4 per cubic meter
(m2).  In July 1989, the fee was raised to $7/m3;  the fee was raised to $10/m 3
in June 1990.  While this increase in fees is a strong positive step, the
share of rent collected through the tax system is still estimated to be around
30 percent. Furthermore,  there  are  a  number  of inefficiencies  in the  present
forestry tax system.  A detailed discussion of the present Indonesian forest
revenue  system  and  how this  can  be  made  more effective  is  presented  later  in
Section  V.
59.  The  use  of  water  charges  for  efficien-  and sustainable  exploitation
is  even  more limited. Irrigation,  which is  the single  largest  source  of  water
use, remains  virtually  a free  service. Recently,  the  Government  initiated  a
pilot  scheme  to test  the  possibility  of implementing  an irrigation  service
fee. The  main objective  of this fee  is to  mobilize  revenue  at the  local
level,  to  help finance  the  operation  and  maintenance  (O&M)  of specific
irrigation  systems. In the  case  of  municipal  water  supply,  the  main elements
of the  tariff  structure  are:  (a)  a relatively  large  cross-subsidy  provided  to
connected  households  (in  the  form  of subsidized  water rates  even  at relatively
high consumption  levels),  which is financed  by a  high surcharge  levied  on
commercial  and  industrial  users;  and (b)  high  connection  charges,  which for
certain  areas  are  typically  set  above  the  cost  of installation.  The  present
tariff  system  for  piped  water is  both  inefficient  and  inequitable. By- 19 _
subsidizing  water  consumption  for  all  households,  it  encourages  excessive  use.
Furthermore,  the  subsidy  is  poorly  targeted;  it  disproportionately  benefits
the  better-off  who can  afford  the  connection  fee  and  who consume  water  more
heavily,  while  the  substantial  standpipe  connection  charge  prevents  the  poor
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the  generally  ineffective  and  low  fees  for  groundwater  extraction,  the  higher
industrial  and  commercial  water  rates  push these  users  towards  private
provision  of  water,  which  in turn  risks  inefficient  overextraction  of
groundwater.
60.  Subsidies. In Indonesia,  subsidies  on fertilizer  and  pesticides
have been  a  major  element  of the  Government's  agricultural  policy  framework.
Like the  water subsidy,  pesticide  and fertilizer  subsidies  have tended  to
support  inefficient  use  of these  inputs  in  agricultural  production. Although
the  immediate  effects  of over-reliance  on chemical  fertilizers  are less
apparent  than  those  of overuse  of pesticides,  they  have long-term  adverse
impact  on soil  fertility. Chemical  fertilizers  can  also lead  to  water
pollution. Agricultural  runoff  containing  high  levels  of nitrogen  and
phosphorous  can  result  in eutrophication  of lakes  and  rivers. Although  some
progress  has  been  made in reducing  the  fertilizer  subsidy,  through  a series  of
price  increases  over  1988-90,  it still  remains  large,  especially  in relation
to economic  prices.
61.  Recently,  however,  fiscal  policy  has been  very effective  in
contributing  to the  reduction  of environmental  degradation  from  the  use  of
pesticides. In  addition  to the  regulatory  and technological  measures  noted  in
para. 56  above,  the  Government  phased  out  the  pesticide  subsidy  over  a three
year  period. By 1990  the  subsidy  was  eliminated.
62.  Unlike  the fertilizer  and  pesticides  subsidies,  a pro-environment
subsidy  is the  reforestation  subsidy. Since  financial  returns  to  plantation
forests  are  low (less  than  6 percent),  the  Government's  policy  is to  provide  a
subsidy  for  encouraging  reforestation.  This  subsidy  is financed  from  the
reforestation  fee.  There  are,  however,  a  number  of problems  with the  present
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three  years. Given  the  short  tenure  (20  years)  of the  lease,  the
concessionaires  have little  incentive  to  plant  and  maintain  high  value  trees.
ConsequerFly,  concessionaires  have an incentive  to  plant  the  cheapest  trees,
abandoning  them  after  the  third  year,  thereby  making  a profit  on the  subsidy.
Second,  there  is  a risk  that  the  subsidy  might  create  an undesirable  incentive
in  fav'or  of  short-rotation  plantations,  such  as pulpwood,  which is already
financially  viable.
63,  Public  E),'enditure.  The  lack  of an adequate  data  base  precludes  a
reliable  analysis  of public  outlays  on environmental  control  activities  in
Indonesia. Fragmented  evidence  suggests  that  public  expenditures  are largely
focused  on solid  waste  management  and  kampung  improvement  programs  (KIPs).
Some  resources  have also  been  provided  for  research;  however,  the  amount  is
believed  to be very small. For  example,  research  outlays  in the  forestry
sector  have amounted  to less  than  $2.0  million,  one  of the  lowest  levels  in
the  Asia Pacific  Region  (World  Bank,  1990a). Total  public  expenditure  related
to the  disposal  of human  waste  and  slum  upgrading  (KIPs)  have  been in the
ran-e  ef $50  60  million,  which is less  than  1 percent  of total  development- 20 -
expenditure  or lesF  than  a fifth  of the  outlay  on fertilizer  subsidy. This is
one  priority  area  where  relatively  modest  levels  of public  expenditure  can
have large  improvements  in the  quality  of environment  as well as in the
welfare  of the  poor.  Overall,  there  is an important  policy  need to reexamine
the  pubzliz  'd's  …sa.….d  -. ;h  a vice  lo cnhancing  the
share  of outlays  for  environmental  protection.
Institutional  Framework  for  Environmental  Management
64.  There  are  three  major  determinants  of the  effectiveness  of an
institutional  framework  for  environmental  management: (a)  the  adequacy  of the
legal  framework;  (b)  the  establishment  of  appropriate  management  agencies  and
interagency  coordination;  and (c)  availability  of adequate  well-trained  staff.
65.  Legal  Framework. The  cornerstone  of environmental  law  in Indonesia
was enacted  in 1982 (Law  4/1982). This  law,  entitled  'The  Basic  Provisions
for  the  Management  of the  Living  Environment"  serves  as an umbrella  for  more
detailed  implementing  regulations  and  decrees. Among  its  provisions  are:
(i)  the role  of the  State  Ministry  for  Population  and  Environment  (MPE)  as the
coordinating  ministry  for  the  environment  was codified;  (ii)  the  provinces
were given  authority  over  provincial  environmental  matters;  (iii)  an
environmental  impact  analysis  was  mandated  for  each  project  with environmental
implications;  and (iv)  environmental  protection  was to  be guided  by new
quality  standards. The  enactment  of Law  4/1982  put  environmental  legislation
on a solid  legal  basis;  however,  there  remains  an important  unfinished  agenda.
Draft  regulations  on  water/air  and  toxic  wastes  are  yet  to be finalized. The
water  quality  guidelines  have  not  been implemented  so far.  In general,  the
enforcement  of regulations  remain  to be  made effective.
66.  Appropriate  Environment  Agencies  and  Coordination.  As noted,  the
MPE is the  key  environmental  agency  in  Indonesia. The  main functions  are  to:
(a)  coordinate  the  formulation  of Government  policies  on population  and  the
environment;  (b)  develop  regulations  for implementation  by national  and  local
level  institutions;  (c)  provide  technical  advice  and  assistance  to line
agencies;  (d)  monitor  the  environmental  performance  of  ministries  and
provinces;  and (e)  coordinate  the  development  of environmental  awareness  and
participation.
67.  In addition  to the  MPE,  each  ministerial  agency  is responsible  for
environmental  matters  in its  particular  area  or territory. For  example,  the
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industrial  sector. In the  past,  line  agencies  carried  out  their  mandates
without  explicit  reference  to the  environment. The  Presidential  Decree
29/1986,  however,  established  a  process  and  an institutional  arrangement  for
carrying  out  environmental  impact  assessment  (EIA)  at the  line  ministerial
level. The  most serious  difficulty  encountered  with the  EIA process  is that,
while  there  are  many projects  which  need  to be evaluated,  implementation
capacitv  is severely  constrained  (World  Bank,  1990a).
68.  Environmental  issues  at the  regional  level  are  handled  by the
provincial  governments. The  authority  vested  in the  provincial  governor  is
wide-.-anging:  (a)  to set  standards;  (b)  to license  and  check  new  projects;
(c)  to  monitor  adherence  to environmental  laws;  and (d)  to enforce  laws.  The- 21 -
main planning  and  coordinating  agency  at the  provincial  level  is the  BAPPEDA,
which  works  directly  under  the  governor. A unit  dealing  with environmental
matters  has recently  been  established  by presidential  decree  in each
provincial  governor's  office. This  agency,  called  The  Bureau  for  Population
and  Environment  (BKLH),  is  a low-level,  advisory  group  which reports  to an
assistant  secretary  in  the  governors'  office.
69.  A number  of important  institutional  improvements  have occurred  over
the  past few  years.  In November  1988,  the  Government  established  the  National
Land  Board,  reporting  directly  to the  President. Subsequently,  an inter-
ministerial  committee  was formed  to review  policy  issues  related  to spatial
planning. In 1990,  a presidential  decree  was  issued  to establish  a pollution
monitoring  and control  agency  reporting  directly  to the  President. The aims
of these  initiatives  are  to strengthen  environmental  policy  formulation  and
improve  inter-agency  coordination.
70.  Nevertheless,  inter-agency  coordination  needs  further  strengthening.
The  role  of the  MPE  as the  key  environmental  management  agency  is limited  by
its  lack  of official  authority  over  other  ministries,  its  lack  of influence
over  the  budget  process  which  generates  line  agency  priorities,  and  by its  own
staffing  and  financing  limitations.  A major institutional  bottleneck  is the
lack  of appropriate  environmental  agencies  at the  provincial  level.  BAPPEDAS
is  a general  planning  agency  at the  local  level,  and its  capacity  to  perform
environmental-related  functions  is seriously  limited. At the same  time,  as
noted,  the  provincial  counterparts  of  MPE--the  BKLH--have  little  authority  or
resources  to perform  environmental  control  tasks  effectively.
71.  Staffing  Issues. The  lack  of adequate  trained  staff  is a serious
constraint  on the implementation  of environmental  policies. Although  this is
a general  problem,  the  specialized  skills  needed  for  such  activities  as the
measurement  of environmental  impact,  monitoring  of  environmental  standards,
and  environmental  research  are  especially  scarce. The  problem  is compounded
by weak employment  incentives  at the  government  level. This suggests  that  the
minimization  of implementation  costs  needs  to  be a key factor  in the  design  of
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SECTION V:  FISCAL POLICY OPTIONS FOR INDONESIA'S
ENVIRONMENTAL  MANAGEMENT
Importance  of  Fiscal  Policy
72.  The choice  of policy  instruments  for  environmental  control  has  been
extensively  discussed  in the  literature. For  example,  excellent  reviews  are
available  in  Baumol  and  Oates (1988)  and  Hahn (1989). The  discussion,
hct-ever,  is  mostly  focused  on developed  countries  and  concerns  pollution
management. Nevertheless,  a  number  of important  findings  are  of relevance  to
tbe  design  of environmental  policies  in  developing  countries. First,  market-
based  instruments  (taxes  and  charges,  subsidies,  marketable  permits,  ownership
rights)  are  more cost  effective  than  command  and  control  type  instruments
(standards, fixed permits).  Second, taxes are likely to be more efficient
than  subsidies. Third,  a balanced  combination  of policy  instruments  is likely
to  be more effective  than  major reliance  on the  use  of any single  instrument.
Finally,  the  practical  relevance  of any single  instrument  andl  their  effective
mix is critically  dependent  on the  administrative  capacity  to implement
policies.  The  weaker  this  capacity,  the  greater  is the  potential  role  of
market-based  instruments. In developing  countries,  another  critical  dimension
of the  policy  choice  is the  budget  constraint.
73.  The  previous  section  reviewed  the  progress  on environmental  policy
in Indonesia. The  main findings  are:  (a)  attention  has  mostly  been
concentrated  on command  and  control  type  regulatory  policies;  (b)  the  use  of
market  based  instruments,  including  fiscal  policy,  has  been limited  and
unfocused;  (c)  despite  notable  progress  in setting  up institutions,
implementation  capac.ty  remains  severely  constrained  mainly  due  to staffing
problems;  and (d)  there  is substantial  scope  for  reallocating  public
expenditure  in favor  of environmental  projects.
74.  Needless  to say,  a balanced  combination  of taxes/charges,  subsidies,
public  expenditures,  ownership  rights  and standards  will work  better  than  full
reliance  on any  single  policy  instrument.  At the  present  time,  however,  there
is  a need for  Indonesia  to increase  its  use  of fiscal  policy  instruments.
Given  serious  administrative  capacity  constraints,  greater  reliance  on fiscal
policy  instruments  is likely  to  be more cost  effective  than  the  extensive
pursuit  of standards. An added  advantage  of fiscal  policy  instruments,  such
as taxes  and  charges,  is their  contribution  to government  revenues. These
revenues  will help finance  the  needed  expenditure  increases  for  environmental
iLiprovement  activities.
Practical  Applications  of Fiscal  Policy  Instruments
75.  Much of the  experience  with the  use  of fiscal  policy  instruments  is
focused  on pollution  control  ir.  developed  countries. A  wide range  of
emissions  charges  (both  user  and  emission)  has  been  used in  developed
countries  (Table  3).  User charges  generally  include  payments  for  treating  or
storing  waste,  such  as garbage. Emission  charges  generally  apply  to charges
on specific  pollutants  that  are  discharged  into  the  environment.V
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Table  3:  POLLUTION  CHARGES  IN SELECTED  DEVELOPED  COUNTRIES
Charges ->  Solid  Hazardous
Countrie&  WaLe  air  waste  waste  Noise  Products
Australia  X  X
Denmark  x
France  X  X  X  X  X
Germany  X  X  X  X  X  X
Hungary  X
Italy  X  X
Finland  X
Japan  X  X
Netherlands  X  X  X  X  X  X
Norway  X  X  X
Sweden  X  X
Switzerland  X
United  Kingdom  X  x
United  States  of  America  X  X  X  X
Source: Hahn 1989.
Hahn's  review  of charge  systems  in France,  Germany,  Netherlands  and  the  USA
yields  the following  Insights:
o  The  major  motivation  for  implementing  an emission  fee  has been  to
raise  revenues. Most revenues  are  earmarked  for  the  improvement  of
environmental  quality. Usually,  the  revenues  are  used to  provide
subsidies,  grants  or loans  to  private  firms  and to  help support
treatment  plants.
O  The  number  of charges  that  have  documented  effects  on polluter
behavior  is  only  a small  subset  of the  total  number  of charges.
O  The  main  way charges  had a  positive  impact  on environmental  quality
was through  the  use  of charge  revenues  for  abatement  activities.
O  There  has been  a tendency  for  charges  to  be raised  over  time,  even
after  allowing  for  inflation.
76.  The  lack  of conclusive  evidence  on the  direct  effect  of charges  on
polluter  behavior  needs  to  be interpreted  cautiously. First,  data  to test  the
impact  of charges  on the  environment  are  generally  scarce. Second,  most
charges  have  not been large  enough  to induce  dramatic  changes  in firm
behavior. And third,  charges  have  generally  been  designed  to promote
environmental  quality  through  the  redistribution  of funds  to these  activities.
The indirect  effect  of charges  on environmental  quality  has  been significant.
Apart from  these  caveats,  an earlier  study  by Baumol  and  Oates  (1975)  found  a
significant  direct  positive  impact  of charges  on  pollution  reduction. The- 24  -
study  concluded: "We  are  thus  beginning  to accumulate  some  evidence
indicating  that  effluent  fees  can  in fact  be quite  effective  in reducing
levels  of industrial  waste  charges  into  waterways"  (P.119).
Fiscal  Policy  Options  for  Indonesia
77.  Forest  Management. The forest  resource  based  charges  currently
levied  in  Indonesia  include: license  fees (per  hectare),  land  tax (PBB),
reforestation  fee (per  cubic  meter),  royalty  (per  cubic  meter),  and
scaling/grading  fee (volume/weight  based). Of these,  the royalty  and
reforestation  fee  are the  most important  charges. Timber  royalty  is 6 percent
of the  estimated  market  value  of logs. The reforestation  fee  was set  at $4
per cubic  meter (m3)  up to June  1989.  The  fee  was raised  to $7/mr  in July
1989  and  to $10/m 3 in June  1990.  Total  revenue  collected  from forestry
charges  increased  from  Rp 117.5  billion  in  1980  to Rp 439.0  billion  in 1989.
With the  recent  increase  in  the reforestation  fee,  the  total  revenues  is
expected  to double  to Rp 800-900  billion. The  potential  for  revenue
mobilization  is,  however,  much higher.
78.  A number  of studies  have indicated  that  there  are  serious
inefficiencies  with the  present  system  of forestry  charges  (FAO,  1990;  Pearce,
et al. 1990a;  Gillis,  1988;  Sedjo,  1987). The  main  problems  are:
o  the  value  of rent-capture  from  forest  concessionaires  is very  low,
estimated  at around  30  percent  only. As compared  with this,  rent
capture  in Sabah,  Malaysia  is  85-90  percent. The low  rent-capture
encourages  excessive  forest  exploitation  by promoting  "rent-seeking"
behavior  as  well as by inducing  official  support  for  higher
production  as a means  for  increasing  revenue.
O  the  assessment  of timber  royalties  on the  basis  of timber  removals
rather  than  the stock  of  merchantable  stems  in  the stand  encourages
logging  operators  to remove  osily  the  most  valuable  species  and  high
grade  stems. Such "high-grading"  often  leads  to substantial  damage
to the  stand  and  extensive  forest  destruction;
o  The  lease  on forest  concessions  is for  a  period  of 20 years  only.
Given  that  regeneration  extends  over  a 35-year  period  or longer,
concessionaires  have little  incentive  to  ensure  the  long-term
regeneration  of the  logged  forest. On the  other  hand,  there  is  a
tendency  to log  the  primary  forest  within  the  20-year  period;
o  The  practice  of basing  timber  royalty  on processed  wood encourages
under-reporting  of the level  of logging  and  provides  little
incentive  to improve  mill efficiency. This latter  problem  occurs
because  a  more efficient  conversion  adds  more to the  cost  of
production  and  tax  obligation  than  to the  value  of added  output.
79.  Fiscal  Policy  for  a  More  Efficient  and  Sustainable  Exploitation  of
Forest  Resources. A major  factor  underlying  the  distortions  in the  present
system  of forestry  resource  exploitation  is the  relatively  short-term  nature
of forest  lease  arrangements.  Most experts  suggest  the following  alternative
lease  arrangements:- 25 -
o  extending  the lease  period  to 35  years  or beyond  to  coincide  with
the  regeneration  period;
o  awarding  leases  on a rollover  basis,  whereby  every  five  years  the
contract  would  be extended  subjeci  to satisfactory  performance;
o  allowing  the  marketability  of leases  to provide  incentives  for
maintaining  the  value  of the  lease.
80.  A second  source  of distortion  is  the  tax  mechanism  which is  based  on
timber  removal  rather  than  the stock  of  merchantable  stems  in  the stand. This
could  be corrected  by shifting  the  tax  base  to the  stock  of  merchantable  stems
in  the stand. With this  new policy,  not only  the  concessionaire  will avoid
the logging  of  medium  and  smaller  stems,  because  they  will  be worth  more at
maturity,  it  will also  have an incentive  to  harvest  defective  and  oversized
stems  of commercial  but less-valuable  species. The  present  problem  of "high
grading"  of stands  will be reduced.
81.  There  is a  major  need to increase  the  value  of rent  mobilized  by the
Government. This  is  necessary  not only  to raise  revenues,  but,  even  more
importantly,  to reduce  excessive  exploitation  of forest  resources  resulting
from  rent-seeking  behavior  of concessionaires.  Indicative  estimates  suggest
that rents  from  forestry  activities  are  in the  range  of $30-40  per  m3. As
against  this,  the level  of taxes  collected  are  about  $7  per  m3. Even after
allowing  for  the recent  increase  in reforestation  fees  and  assuming  full
collection,  the  surplus  rent  would remain  at $17-27  per  m3--or about
60 percent. The  aim  of policy  could  be to reduce  this  rent  to 10-15  percent.
82.  Forest  Subsidies. The  Government's  strategy  for  reforestation  and
associated  subsidy  arrangements  need to  be changed. A number  of steps  can  be
taken  to improve  the  effectiveness  of the  reforestation  program. First,  the
increase  in the  concessionaires  tenure  to 35  years  or longer  would  help  to
provide  better  incentives  for  longer-term  investments.  Second  the
concessionaires  could  be given  technical  support  for  proper  species  selection
and  appropriate  site  selection. The  latter  could  be targeted  to  wasteland  and
deforested  areas  to avoid  conversion  of  natural  forest  land  to plantations.
Third,  enrichment  planting  of selectively  cut  stands  and  the  development  of
methods  of regenerating  indigenous  hardwoods  could  be made eligible  for
reforestation  funds. Finally,  plantations  involving  short-duration  trees
(pulpwood)  should  not  be eligible  for  subsidy.
83.  Fiscal  Policy  for  Pollution  Management. The  review  of developed
country  experience  indicated  that  a  wide  variety  of  pollution  charges  has
been  used.  Experience  also suggests  that  success  was most  notable  for  water
pollution  charges  (Hahn.  1989). In France  and  Germany,  the  water  effluent
charge  is imposed  on the  basis  of the  expected  level  of discharge  by  various
industries. In the  Netherlands,  charges  are  based  on the  actual  level  of
discharge  for  large  polluters,  while small  polluters  often  pay fixed  fees
unrelated  to actual  discharge. In USA,  a  mixture  of actual  discharge  and rule
of thumb  has  been followed.
84.  Given  the  difficulties  of  measuring  and  monitoring  discharges  for
individual  polluters,  a simplified  effluent  charge  is suggested  for  Indonesia- 26  -
at this  initial  stage. The  effluent  charge  ceuld  initially  be levied
selectively,  focussed  on the  most  heavily  polluted  areas (for  example  Jakarta,
Bandung  and  Surabaya)  and  for  industrial  activities  that  are  believed  to  be
among  the  heaviest  contributors  to  water  pollution. Each firm  within  the
industty  would  pay a  uniform  charge. As experlence  is gained  and  capacity  to
measure  and  monitor  emissions  is developed,  the  charge  could  be extended  and
linked  to the  actual  level  of discharge. At the initial  stage,  the  fee  would
need  to be at a somewhat  modest  level,  but  adjustments  will  need to be  made
over  time.
85.  Even if  a direct  emission  reduction  does  not result  from  this  fee,
pollution  reduction  can still  be achieved  by using  these  funds  for  promoting
the  use  of abatement  equipments. The  subsidy  could  be provided  in the  form  of
outright  grants  or as subsidized  loans.
86.  In  view of the limited  role  at present  for  a direct  effluent  charge,
fiscal  policy  can  also focus  on indirect  means--through  taxation  of inputs  and
outputs  in  polluting  sectors. An.  attractive  option  in this regard  is the
environmental  user  charge  on energy. The  applicability  of this  tax for  the
near future,  however,  is constrained  by the  need to first  readjust  the
structure  of energy  prices  on efficiency  grounds;  this  itself  will entail
large  increases  in the  prices  of relatively  high  pollution  intensive  energy
products. The first  step,  therefore,  will be to realign  the  individuwl  energy
prices  with reference  to their  economic  values.8/ As noted,  this  will
automatically  result  in a  more environmentally-sound  pattern  of energy
production  and  consumption. Nevertheless,  the  possibility  of a user  charge  on
energy  for  reducing  air  pollution  differentiated  according  to the "pollutant
content"  of each  energy  product,  needs  to be among  the  fiscal  policy  options
for  Indonesia's  environmental  protection.
87.  Similarly,  urban  congestion  pricing  could  be applied  to reduce
traffic  densities,  improve  traffic  efficiency  and  reduce  air  pollution  in
major  urban  centers. The  Singapore  Area Traffic  Licensing  Scheme  of 1976  is
the  best  known  example  of successful  urban  congestion  pricing  (Jones,  1989).
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during  peak  hours,  with exemptions  for  buses,  motorcycles  and  car  pools. The
scheme  has (a)  reduced  peak  traffic  densities;  (b)  raised  revenues  for
financing  of urban  services  and  infrastructure  projects;  (c)  curtailed  fuel
consumption;  and (D)  reduced  air  pollution  levels  significantly.  Such  a
scheme  could  be developed  for  Jakarta  in  conjunction  with improved  provision
'df  publli  traLGUJ.  LatLio.
88.  One  other  fiscal  option  for  reducing  pollution  in Indonesia  is the
reduction/elimination  of the  chemical  fertilizer  subsidy. Apart from  reducing
environmental  and  health  hazards,  a reduction  in the  financial  subsidy  on
fertilizer,  by say  50 percent,  alone  would  finance  almost  a threefold  increase
in the  level  of public  expenditure  on  human  waste  management  and slum
8/  The  most recent  adjustment  of energy  prices  that  were announced  in  early
July  1991  have reduced  the  extent  of distortions  in relative  energy
prices.  Nevertheless, there still reizains  Lhe  cea  Lor further
adjustments.- 27  -
upgrading. This  policy  will also  be a  more cost-effective  means  of reaching
the  poor.
89.  Fiscal  Policy  for  Land  Management. A major  factor  causing  land
degradation  Lc the  lac!;.  of  a  wc1l  u.tkcL.4  Thie  appropriate
definition  of property  rights,  removal  of official  barriers  to land
transactions,  and a  more flexible  attitude  towards  forestry  land
classification,  will all  help in  encouraging  the  development  of efficient  land
markets. At the same  time,  to  promote  efficient  use as  well as revenue
mobilization,  allocation  of public  land  for  private  use  needs  to  be based  on
pzices  that  reflect  market  values. Regarding  the reduction  of soil  erosion,
the  main  way that fiscal  policy  can contribute  is through  a reassessment  of
the  Government's  expenditure  priority  in agriculture  in favor  of activities
that  will minimize  land  degradation  (Pearce,  et.  al., 1990b). Since  upland
farmers  face  significant  costs  in  adopting  soil  conservation  measures  and
changes  in farming  system,  they  are  unlikely  to invest  in  better  land
management  unless  there  is  a perceived  economic  advantage  from  this.
Furthermore,  poorer  upland  farmers,  dependent  on low-value  crops,  may simply
be unable  to afford  high-cost  soil  conservation  measures. A combination  of
general  economic  policies  and  public  expenditures,  that  both increase
agricultural  productivity  and  incomes  of  upland  farmers  and  reduce  the
economic  pressures  on farmers  to deplete  the  land  and  accelerate  soil  erosion,
will be required. The  main priorities  for  public  expenditure  are:
o  research  and  extension  to support  low-cost  farm  technology  for
upland  farmers;
o  building  thE'  physical  infrastructure  of the  uplands,  such  as rural
transport,  tor  integrating  post-harvest  technology  and  processing.
90.  Fiscal  Policy  for  Water  Management. User  charges  will need to  play
a  major role  in ensuring  the  efficient  and  sustainable  use  of  water resources.
As noted,  irrigation  water  is  virtually  a free  good. Although  some  progress
has recently  been  made in implementing  an irrigation  service  fee,  its
applicastion  so far  has  been  very limited. Further-more,  the  aim  of the  fee  is
to cover  the  cost of  O&M  it is  not linked  to the  volume  of  water  used.  Thus,
while  system  efficiency  will  be improved  through  better  maintenance,  there  may
be no affect  on the  efficiency  of  water  consumption. As a first  step,
however,  the fee  needs  to be extended  to the  national  level. With the
successful  implementation  of this  step,  consideration  will  need to be  given  to
redesigning  the fee  into  a  broader,  volume-babea !LaL&ie  for  irrigation  water.
91.  In the  case  of domestic  water,  the  main difficulty  at present  is the
distortion  of  water  charges  that  causes  industrial  and  commercial  users  to
substitute  groundwater  for  piped  water.  This  not only results  in inefficient
use  of  water,  it also  risks  unsustainable  groundwater  extraction. The tax  on
industrial  and commercial  consumers  is appropriate  to  mobilize  resources
needed  to expand  piped  water.  But  major  changes  are  needed  in the  tariff
policy  for residential  consumers. The  residential  subsidy  is poorly  targeted;
it disproportionately  benefits  the  better-off  who can  afford  the  high
connection  charge,  set  above  installation  cost  in some  areas,  and  who consume
water  more  heavily--the  rates  are  subsidized  even at relatively  high levels  of
residential  consumption. The intended  equity  objectives  would be  better- 28 -
served  by:  (a)  targeting  the  residential  subsidy  at lifeline  consumption
levels  (say,  five  m /month);  (b)  reducing  the  connection  charge  for  the  poor
to actual  cost; (c)  allowing  installment  payments  spread  over  five  years  for
the  connection  fees  to low  income  households;  and (d)  eliminating  subsidy  at
higher  levels  of consumption.
92.  Increased  reliance  on private  groundwater  extraction  is an efficient
means  of meetIng  growth  in the  demand  for  water  where it  entails  lower
economic  costs  than  public  piped  water  and  groundwater  resources  are
plentiful. However,  tariff  policies  favoring  this  source  risk  inefficient
extraction  of groundwater--only  a  partially  renewable  resource--at
unsustainable  rates  where  water is scarce. The  latter  is indeed  the  case in
some  major  urban  areas,  notably  in  Jakarta  where groundwater  extraction  is
believed  to be running  well beyond  sustainable  levels. ln  contrast  to the
high tariffs  on piped  water for  industrial  and  commercial  use, fees  for
groundwater  extraction  are  generally  very low. In areas  of plentiful
groundwater  resources,  low  fees  sufficient  to cover  the  administrative  costs
of licensing  may be justified. However,  as groundwater  becomes  scarcer,  as in
many urban  areas,  extraction  fees  need to  be raised  to reflect  the increasing
cost  and scarcity  of the  resource  and to align  these  fees  with tariffs  on
piped  municipal  water.
93.  The  distortionL  of incentives  resulting  f.om  the  underpricing  of
groundwater  is exacerbated  by  weaker  enforcement  of groundwater  charges. In
principle,  licenses  are  issued  for  groundwater  extraction,  the rate  of
extraction  is  metered  and  fees  are  levied  on  water  use.  In practice,  however,
these  are  not  effectively  enforced. Unlicensed  drilling  and  undercollection
of fees  are  common,  encouraging  wasteful  use  of the  resource. It  has been
estimated  that  up to 75  percent  of groundwater  drilling  and  extraction  are
done  outside  the  official  licensing  and fee  system. Accordingly,  appropriate
adjustments  in groundwater  charges  need  to be accompanied  by measures  to
ensure  more effective  enforcement.
Use  of Fiscal  Revenues: Earmarking
94.  A pertinent  issue  is the  use  of revenues  generated  through
environment-based  taxes  and charges. The experience  of developed  countries
suggest  that  the  earmarking  of pollution-based  revenues  for  financing
pollution  abatement  equipments  is  common.9/ In  the  case of Indonesia,  the
reforestation  tax is  earmarked  for  reforestation  activities. While  some
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Although  the  experience  of developed  countries  suggest  that  the  main source  of
environmental  improvement  has  been the  financing  of  pollution  reduction
activities,  it is  not  necessary  that  such  activities  be only  financed  through
earmarked  funds. What is important  is  that the  level  of subsidy  or
expenditure  that  is needed  to induce  a desirable  level  of environmental
improvement  activity  should  be  made available. This is  an expenditure
priority  issue;  whether  it is financed  through  pollution/forestry  taxes  or
whether  revenues  are  obtained  from  other  sources  is  not always  a critical
9/  This  is  based  on the 'polluter  pays  principle"--that  is,  the  polluter
should  finance  the  pollution  abatement  equipment.- 29 -
consideration.  However,  earmarking  could  become  an important  consideration  if
tax/cha:ge  compliance  is directly  linked  to the  recycling  of collected
revenues  and  there  is a risk  of  underfunding  of the  program.
95S.  On the  other  hand,  earmarking  could  result  in inefficient  resource
allocation. For  example,  the recent  increase  in  the reforestation  tax  is
expected  to increase  revenues  from  $146  million  in 1989  to $350  million  in
1991.  These  resources  are  too  large  relative  to the  level  of efficient
reforestation  activity  that  could  be financed. In  view of the  many other
pressing  activities,  environment-related  or otherwise,  that  could  be financed
from  the  surplus  resources,  keeping  that  fund  unused  would  be inefficient.
Even  worse,  the  earmarking  of funds  could  promote  the  financing  of inefficient
forestry  projects  ir.  an attempt  to exhaust  the  funds.
Implementation  Issues
96.  A  major  hindrance  to the  wider  use of environmental  taxes  and
charges  is the  possibility  of a  political  backlash. The  experience  of
developed  countries  indicates  that  the firms  had initially  oppcsed  the
introduction  of emission  charges  (Hahn,  1989). This is  a natural  response  of
a private  profit  maximizer. Strong  political  support  is,  therefore,  essential
for  the  successful  implementation  of environmental  taxes/charges.  A second
prerequisite  is the  improvement  of the  tax  collection  system. Availability  of
information  is  a major  problem;  this  is compounded  by the  general  problem  of
staff  shortage. Fortunately,  the  initial  staffing  requirements  of
implementing  the  kinds  of  charges  suggested  in this  paper  are  not  expected  to
be overwhelming.  For  example,  the  mechanism  for  collecting  forest  taxes
already  exists. Much of the  incremental  tax revenues  will come from  the
suggested  increase  in the  tax  rate,  based  on the logic  of eventually  raising
rent-capture  to 85-90  percent. Of course,  there  is an important  need to
improve  the  administrative  efficiency  of the  present  arrangements  through
better  information,  planning  and  enforcement. This,  in turn,  will require
some  increases  in  the  number  of tax  staff. At the  same  time,  there  is a need
to consolidate  forestry  revenues  with the  nat.onal  budget  to ensure  proper
aucounLing  ana  appropriate  use  or these  resources. In the  case of  pollution
charges,  the  initial  proposal  is  to introduce  a simple  effluent  charge,  and
for  a limited  number  of areas  and  enterprises.  Although  the initial  tax  rate
will need  to be based  on some  estimate  of the  average  pollution  damage,  once
this is  known,  the  administration  of the  tax  should  be relatively  simple.
Similarly,  the institutional  arrangements  for  municipal  water  charges  are in
place;  the  correction  of the  present  water tariff  distortions  should  not
result  in an added  administrative  burden. An extra  effort  will,  however,  be
needed  to implement  groundwater  charges.- 30 -
Section  VI:  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS
97.  Natural  resources  are  critical  to Indonesia's  development. In
recognition  of the  close  link  between  economic  development  and  environment,
Indonesia  has  maintainea  a long-standing  commitment  to the  basic  concepts  of
sound  environmental  management. A number  of corrective  steps  have already
been  taken  to reduce  environmental  degradation  and  promote  a  more sustainable
pattern  of development. Overall,  the focus  of environmental  management  has
been on regulatory  instruments. The  use  of fiscal  policy  has  been limited.
98.  Indonesia's  key  environmental  concerns  are:  (a)  the degradation  of
land  in Java  and  the  outer  islands;  (b)  deforestation  in  the  outer  islands;
(c)  inefficient  and  unsustainable  use  of  water,  especially  in  Java;  and
(d)  pollution  in Java.  The  Government's  policy  progress  has  concentrated  on
developing  regulatory  policies  for  industrial  pollution  control,  forestry
exploitation  and  the  appropriate  use  of pesticides  in agricultural  production.
Although  significant  progress  has been  achieved  in developing  the
institutional  framework  for  applying  environmental  regulations,  the
implementation  capacity  is still  constrained  by the  lack  of trained  staff.
99.  Although  there  are  a  number  of taxes  and  charges  linked  to the  use
of forest  and  water resources,  a systematic  approach  towards  the  use  of fiscal
policy  instruments  for  environmental  management  does  not exist  in Indonesia.
The  number  of taxes  and  charges  in the  forestry  sector  are  too  many and
determined  on an ad-hoc  basis. Despite  recent  increases  in the  reforestation
fee,  rent  capture  is low (around  30  percent);  moreover,  there  are  a  number  of
inefficiencies  in  the  present  forestry  tax  system. The  use  of water  charges
for  efficient  and sustainable  water  use is  even  more limited. Irrigation
water  remains  virtually  free,  while there  are significant  distortions  in
municipal  water  charges. Groundwater  use is  not regulated  properly  and  is
often  exploited  as a free  resource. There  is  no effluent  charge/tax  for
pollution.
100.  Subsidy  and  expenditure  instruments  are  also  largely  ineffective  or
used inadequately.  The  reforestation  subsidy  is generally  ineffective,  while
public  expenditure  for  environmental  improvement  programs  is very limited.
Fertilizer  subsidy,  on the  contrary,  contributes  to the  degradation  of the
environment. One  positive  step,  however,  has  been the  elimination  of the
pesticide  subsidy.
IVi.  ITis  paper  concludes  that  fiscal  policy  can  and should  play  a  major
role  in improving  the  quality  of Indonesia's  environment. The rationale  for
this  is:  (a)  the  experience  of developed  countries  suggests  that  market  based
instruments  (taxes,  charges,  subsidies,  marketable  permits,  ownership  rights)
are  more cost effective  than  command  and  control  type instruments  (standards;
fixed  permits);  (b)  the  effectiveness  of command  and  control  instruments  in
Indonesia  is limited  by the  implementation  capacity  constraint;  fiscal
instruments  are likely  to  be less  constrained  by this  factor;  (c)  an added
advantage  of fiscal  instruments,  such  as taxes  and  charges,  is their
contribution  to government  revenues. These  revenues  can  help finance
environmental  improvement  activities.- 31 -
102.  The  main recommendations  of this  paper  are:
(a)  Forest  Management
o  Extend  the lease  period  for  forest  concessionaires  to 35 years
on a rollover  basis,  whereby  every  five  years  the  contract
would  be extended  subject  to satisfactory  performance.
O  Shift  the  forest  tax  base from  log  output  to the  stock  of
marketable  stems  in the stand.
O  Increase  the  effective  tax  rate  on logging  in stages  to
eventually  allow  a rent-capture  of 85-90  percent.
O  Improve  the  effectiveness  of the  reforestation  program  by:
longer-term  lease;  technical  support  for  proper  species
selection  and  appropriate  site  selection;  making  enrichment
planting  of selectively  cut  stands  and  the  methods  of
regenerating  indigenous  hardwoods  eligible  for  reforestation
funds;  and  making  plantations  involving  short-duration  trees
(pulpwood)  ineligible  for  subsidy.
(b)  Pollution  Management
o  Institute  a simple  effluent  charge,  levied  selectively. The
initial  focus  could  be on the  most heavily  polluted  areas
(Jakarta,  Bandung  and  Surabaya)  and for  industrial  activities
that  are  believed  to be among  the  heaviest  contributors  to
water  pollution. Each firm  within  the industry  would pay  a
uniform  charge. As experience  is gained  and  capacity  to
measure  and  monitor  emissions  is developed,  the  charge  could  be
extended  and linked  to the  actual  level  of discharge.
O  Even if  a direct  emission  reduction  does  not  happen  from this
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funds  for  promoting  the  use  of abatement  equipments. The
subsidy  for  this  purpose  could  be in  the form  of outright
grants  or subsidized  loans.
o  In  view of the limited  role  at present  for  a direct  effluent
charge,  fiscal  policy  car.  al'so  focus  or,  inui-eCL  means--through
taxation  of inputs  and  outputs  in polluting  sectors. An
attractive  option  in this  regard  is the  environmental  user
charge  on energy. As a first  step,  however,  the  present
distortions  in energy  prices  need to be corrected. This,  by
itself,  will contribute  to a  more environmentally-sound  pattern
of energy  production  and  consumption. Subsequently,
consideration  could  be given  to imposing  a  user charge  on
energy,  differentiated  according  to the  pollutant  content  of
each  energy  product.
o  Similarly,  urban  congestion  pricing  could  be applied  to reduce
traffic  densities,  improve  traffic  efficiency  and reduce  air
pollution  in  major  urban  centers.- 32 -
o  Another  fiscal  option  for  reducing  pollution  is the
reduction/elimination  of the subsidy  on chemical  fertilizer.
O  There  is an important  need  to reassess  expenditure  priorities
in favor  of environmental  improvement  projects,  such  as slum
upgrading,  human  waste  management  and  industrial  waste
treatments.
(c)  Land  Management
o  Promote  the  development  of a  well-functioning  land  markets
through: appropriate  definition  of property  rights,  removal  of
official  barriers  to land  transactions,  and  more flexible
attitude  towards  forestry  land  classification.
o  Ensure  that the  allocation  of public  land  for  private  use is
based  on prices  that  reflect  market  values.
O  Reassess  public  expenditure  priorities  in agriculture  in favor
of activities  that  will help  minimize  land  degradation.
O  Improve  soil  conservation  by supporting  and  disseminating
research  on low-cost  farm  tec"nology  for  upland  farmers,  and  by
building  the  physical  infrastructure  of the  uplands,  such  as
rural  transport,  for  integrating  post-harvest  technology  and
processing.
(d)  Water  Management
o  Extend  the irrigation  service  fee  to the  national  level. With
the  successful  implementation  of this  step,  consideration  will
need  to be given  to redesigning  the fee  into  a broader,  volume-
based  charge  for  irrigation  water.
- The residential  subsidy  for  piped  wa&Le,  L.uuld  Le  Latgee  &a
lifeline  consumption  levels  with higher  rates  charged  for
higher  consumption  volumes. A part  of the  present  subsidy
could  be allocated  to support  the  construction  of standpipes  in
poor residential  areas.
o  Raise  groundwater  fees,  in  areas  o' ccIaLivcly  ^Saue
groundwpater  resources,  in line  with  user charges  for  municipal
water.  Improve  enforcement  of licensing  and  tariff  regulations
for groundwater  extraction.
103.  Although  fiscal  policy  will  need to  play an important  role,  this is
only one  area  of policy  intervention.  A comprehensive  environmental
management  strategy  will neec to  be based  on a  balanced  combination  of
regulatory  and  fiscal  policy  instruments.  The successful  implementation  of
this strategy  will require  strong  political  support  and continuous  efforts  to
improve  the  institutional  framework.- 33 -
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